

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 28, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending January 28, 2005

Interactive Electronic Procedures (IEP). A Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) team completed its review this week of the application of the IEP system to nuclear explosive operations. The scope of the master study was to evaluate the IEP equipment and procedures, but did not include approval to use the IEP system for a particular weapon program. The team identified three pre-start findings, but was impressed with the system and its potential to improve procedure place keeping, minimize missed steps, and mine collected data. Implementation will occur only after another NES evaluation of the application of the IEP system to a specific nuclear explosive program, and will need to consider potential electrical and lightning issues.

Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Requirements. The Pantex Management Integration & Controls (MIC) Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) requires adherence to DOE O 452.2B, *Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations*, during the startup and restart of nuclear explosive operations. Conformance with DOE-STD-3015-2001, *Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process*, is explicitly noted in DOE O 452.2B as a requirement. The standard describes, for example, the qualification requirements that must be met to become a certified NESS group member. It is not clear that BWXT is implementing the standard as a contractual obligation. Currently, neither the site office nor the contractor are rigorously fulfilling all of the certification requirements due to resource limitations. On a related topic, BWXT recently recommended not adopting the revised DOE-STD-3015-2004 into the contract due to the high costs of certifying NESS group members in accordance with the standard. PXSO has requested additional information from BWXT before considering the proposal.

PXSO Tooling Program Review. PXSO issued its report resulting from the management review last week of the BWXT tooling program. It noted areas of significant improvement and other elements of the program that remain weak. The team recommended several actions requiring attention prior to declaration of readiness and recommencement of the previously suspended NNSA assessment. Key among them are the broader use of the process to generate inspection requirements, clarification of when particular inspection protocols are required following repairs, establishment of corrective actions to address the causal analysis judgment of needs, and validation that the changes to the special tooling program currently underway are consistent with the program described in the approved, but unimplemented, Sitewide Safety Analysis Report. BWXT was tasked with providing a plan to PXSO within two weeks that addresses the reports findings.

Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) Assessment. A team from the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance began its two week evaluation of ES&H line management this week. The team is focusing on performance during work activities, design and operation of nuclear safety systems, and feedback and improvement; with specific areas reviewed including hoisting and rigging, safety systems oversight, and corrective action management.